

STATINTL

CIA:

Bane of Insider Author's Existence

By Ralph W. McGehee

The Central Intelligence Agency's prepublication review requirement is an issue of paramount importance. A similar kind of censorship is also threatened by President Reagan's March, 1983 executive order which places hundreds of thousands of government employees under identical constraints. Supreme Court decisions and liberal interpretations of the executive order could extend life-long prepublication review constraints over an additional several million government employees and employees of firms doing classified government work. This is a major threat to our constitutionally guaranteed right of free speech and forbodes the approach of 1984 and the national security state.

I am a retired CIA officer who earned numerous awards and medals including the prestigious career intelligence medal. During my last ten years with the CIA I protected its false information on Vietnam. The deficiencies that created the Vietnam War permeate CIA operations and I felt an imperative to tell this to the American people and wrote a book about my experiences. The book did not attempt to reveal the identities of my associates or other classified information.

I had opted for early retirement in 1977 and immediately began research for a book. I feared possible CIA retribution if it discovered I was writing an expose and attempted to keep my activities secret from my friends and family members not living at home. My fears were justified as the CIA soon discovered what I was doing and placed me under close, intimidating, multiple types of surveillance, a surveillance that continues to this day.

I was confused about how to proceed. I could not contact a publisher for anything I might tell him might violate prepublication review restrictions. I decided to work alone without benefit of a contract or guidance from an editor. This was a mistake that cost two years of misguided effort.

On Feb. 26, 1980, following three years of research and writing, I submitted a

manuscript to the CIA. A month later the Publications Review Board (PRB) notified me that it had identified 397 classified items in the text varying in length from one word to several pages. Over the next weeks I worked with a representative of the PRB to prove that those deleted passages did not contain classified information. I sourced my claims primarily to information appearing in the cleared writings of other agency authors.

We agreed on a number of revisions, and I rewrote the text accordingly. Dismayed that I had defeated its claims of secrecy, the PRB reversed earlier decisions and began classifying information that only a short time before it had judged to be not classified. This forced me to again prove many of those claims false and to rewrite the text. Finally, I overcame all objections; and for the first time I had a manuscript, truncated as it was, to shop around to publishers.

The search for a publisher was a long time-consuming effort. Many publishers admitted I had a viable manuscript but all said it needed better focus and rewriting. None but a small ideologically motivated publisher would risk the time and uncertainty of battling the CIA's review process.

Sheridan Square Publications agreed to publish the manuscript only if I would rewrite it as an autobiography. As an aid, I prepared a 50 page outline and sent it to the PRB. In the transmitting letter, I advised that I only wanted the outline for discussions with an editor following which I would rewrite and resubmit the manuscript. The PRB refused to deal with an outline. (Yet a few weeks later the CIA learned that I was to give a speech to the Association of Asian Studies and sent me a registered letter advising that I must submit the speech for review even if only in outline form.) After I had submitted three chapters, the PRB demanded that I complete the entire rewrite before it would release any material. I then had to rewrite the remaining text without the opportunity of consulting my editor.

Led by William Casey, the CIA in early 1982 decided regardless of the legalities to stop my book. It attempted to do this by reclassifying everything of substance that was in my first chapter. When I pointed out

that Executive Order 12065, then in effect, Section 1-607 said "Classification may not be restored to a document already declassified and released to the public under this order and prior orders," the PRB responded in essence that that was tough.

The PRB had ruled that I could not discuss my training or the training site at Camp Peary even though such topics had been declassified and well publicized. More oddly, the PRB ruled that details of the personality test it gives recruits were classified. Yet a proprietary company had copyrighted and published the test. Also, Jack Anderson's column had carried, in over 1,000 newspapers, those same details that the CIA was claiming were classified.

I appealed those and other decisions to Admiral Inman, then the deputy director of the CIA. He recognized the total illegality of the Board's decisions and ruled in my favor in every single instance.

The CIA, however, was determined to prevent publication of my expose. It ruled that the entire second chapter was classified. I contacted *The Washington Post* and the subsequent public exposure forced the CIA to relent. If the story had not run it would have been the end of my book. Embarrassed by the *Post*'s article, the PRB assigned a representative to again work with me over the classified items, and I again rewrote and resubmitted the manuscript. Finally in mid-1982, after more than five years of struggle, I had a cleared manuscript.

From my experiences I conclude that the CIA, reacting as any bureaucracy, uses prepublication review and spurious claims of national security to prevent the American people from learning of its illegal and embarrassing operations. It attempts to deny to the American people information essential to the good of the nation and to our democratic processes. The CIA's efforts demonstrate what we can expect from other agencies given the same authority under President Reagan's executive order.

The national security state regards truth as its greatest enemy and cries national security to destroy our freedoms. I fervently hope that something can be done to prevent this from happening.

Ralph W. McGehee is a former CIA agent. He is the author of *Deadly Deceits: My 25 Years in the CIA*. This article is adapted from testimony he gave in the House of Representatives in hearings on 1984: Civil Liberties and the National Security State. McGehee's testimony was submitted to the PRB for clearance.

FBI Expert Describes How Soviets Work To Get U.S. Secrets

By William J. Choyke
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WASHINGTON

ABOUT 150 CORPORATE executives with "secret" defense clearances met recently in Dallas to listen to an FBI expert describe how the KGB, the Soviet spy apparatus, tries to steal U.S. secrets.

The stereotypical image of a "hostile" intelligence agent photographing an employee in a compromising situation for blackmail purposes is passe, Dave Major, the FBI's leading authority on Soviet industrial espionage, told the group assembled at the headquarters of Texas Instruments.

The Soviet approach, he said, is more subtle.

A "friend of a friend" will slowly acquaint himself with the target, devoting considerable time to getting to know the person and his or her financial condition. Then, playing on that friendship and with the promise of tens of thousands of dollars of financial help, the agent will solicit sensitive information.

This outline, based on real-life spy cases from California's Silicon Valley, reflects a growing concern at the FBI and the Pentagon that some of the most closely guarded U.S. defense secrets are being peddled to the Soviets for six-figure sums.

The meeting Jan. 5, the first of its kind in the defense-oriented Dallas metropolitan region and the second in Texas, was intended as a primer on the Soviet threat to the U.S. defense industry.

Topics included how the Soviets recruit U.S. agents, why defense contractors should keep up-to-date records of employee travel and contacts with foreign nationals, and the importance of constantly reminding workers with security clearance of the *do's* and *don'ts* of handling classified material.

Texas Industry Is Waking Up To Spy Peril

"Because of the attraction of the work being done by defense contractors and others in this area, it makes it almost a certainty that there is a high level of intelligence by hostile intelligence services" in northern Texas, said Parks H. Stearns, supervisor of the FBI's counterintelligence division in Dallas.

THE FBI is part of an overall effort involving the bureau, the Pentagon, the Department of State and the U.S. Customs Service, through its two-year program, Operation Exodus, to clamp down on Soviet industrial espionage and illegal transfer of sophisticated technology that could be used for military purposes.

There are 12,600 defense-related facilities in the United States and 229 in the Dallas-Fort Worth area alone that conduct some type of classified work, ranging from jet fighters to microchips.

Although federal officials have no handle on the extent of Soviet activity in Texas, one top Pentagon security expert believes Soviet interest is so high that agents are already tracking the development of Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corp., a consortium of high-tech companies based in Austin, even though ground breaking for its research plant is at least four months away.

Until recently, the U.S. counter-espionage campaign had been centered on the West and East coasts, prime targets of Soviet activities because of the high-tech industries in Silicon Valley and along Boston's Route 128.

But the investigation was expanded nationwide after a highly classified U.S. intelligence report in the fall of 1961 showed that the Soviet campaign to gain both public and classified information was much broader and more sophisticated than originally believed.

"EVEN FOR those of us who looked at the Soviets for a long time, it was a very startling report," recalls retired Adm. Robert "Bobby" Inman, the consortium's president and a former deputy director of the CIA, and ex-director of the National Security Agency. "It turned out we really didn't know about how they got it. We did know what they had gotten in substantial detail and how they used it."

A CIA report made public in the spring of 1982 disclosed that the Soviets had obtained an array of computers, lasers, radars, guidance and navigation systems through covert means.

Their shopping list for the rest of the decade, the CIA predicted, will include guidance systems for the MX and Trident missiles, complex integrated circuits, large-scale scientific computers such as the U.S.-built CRAY 1, and various computer software.

The intelligence services' review of the Soviet drive showed that the effort to collect as much U.S. technical data as possible began in the early 1970s with the rise of detente, Inman said. A similar effort was made in Western Europe and Japan.

At first, the Soviets "vacuumed-cleaned" as much information as possible, Inman recalled, by reading public documents, including manuals from the U.S. National Technical Information Center, reports from the Government Accounting Office and accounts in the trade press.

The effort, which Pentagon officials say is continuing, is intended to discern what is being developed, who is developing it, where it is being used and where it is going.

"In an open society, there is an incredible array that can be collected in that way," Inman said.

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